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1 Introduction
The rising integration of the Chinese manufacturing industry into the world economy has led China’s
extraordinary trade performance over the past three decades. This spectacular achievement is mainly
attributable to the international segmentation and fragmentation of productions in the global scale
carried out by foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs). A particular form of this slicing of the value-
added chain is processing trade: the activity of assembling tariff exempted imported inputs into final
goods for resale in the foreign markets (Dai et al., 2011). This international processing has been at the
core of China’s outstanding trade expansion. As a means of export promotion, processing trade has
been implemented in China over thirty years and successfully boosted foreign export. It accounts for
nearly half of China’s exports and for forty percent of its imports in the 2000s. Additionally, the sheer
magnitude of processing trade in China has generated a vast number of firms that almost exclusively
produce for foreign countries. I refer to these firms as processing exporters 1. Defever and Riao (2012)
report that more than a third of Chinese manufacturing exporters sold nighty percent or more of their
output abroad between 2000 and 2006. Gao and Tvede (2013) find that the average share of export-only
firms out of all the firms in China is 6.8%, which accounts for 27.56% of the total export value over the
period 1999 and 2008. Processing trade is also gainning popularity in other developing countries. In
2006, processing enterprises from 130 countries employed an estimated 66 million people, accounting
for the majority of exports from countries like China, Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, and recently
sub-Saharan African nations (International Labor Organization, 2007). Motivated by past success,
Chinese government still considers processing trade as a fast and efficient path to industrialization and
has used various aggressive export policies to encourage it to date.
Despite the importance of processing trade in many developing countries, e.g. China, empirical
evidence and theoretical analysis toward processing exporters are scant. Previous studies 2 have accu-
mulated a rich stock of knowledge about firm-level export patterns in developed countries. They found
that exporters tend to be larger and more productive and sell more in the domestic market than their
non-exporting counterparts. In particular, participation in international trade is relatively rare and is
associated with superior value of productivity and other measures of economic performance 3. Never-
theless, the focus has been on the non-processing firms, implying that the framework is not applicable
for developing countries that heavily rely on processing trade.
1pure exporters/processing enterprises/processing exporters are used interchangeably in this paper.
2Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard et al. (2003) and Aw et al. (2002) show that across wide range of countries
and industrial, employment, shipment, wage, productivity, and capital intensity are all higher than non-exporters at any
moment.
3Bernard and Jensen (1994) is the pioneer which presents evidence from U.S. manufacturing showing that a minority
of plants export. Similar findings have emerged for a wide range of other countries, as summarized in Ottaviano et al.
(2011) and World Trade Organization (2008).
1
Processing exporters in China are fundamentally different from the regular exporters, who often
passively receive orders and sometimes even intermediate input from foreign buyers. Chinese producers
only conduct the final assembly, while the foreign firms are responsible for the entire export activity.
Recent empirical research (Lu, 2010; Manova and Yu, 2013; Dai et al., 2011) using the longitudinal
plant and firm-level data from China has overwhelmingly substantiated that the processing exporters
are the least productive surviving firms. Some of these studies have further shown that processing
exporters have the lowest profits, offer the minimum wages, invest the least in R&D and are relatively
small in terms of sale. Other studies (Fu, 2011; Fernandes and Tang, 2013; Lemoine, 2010) have
highlighted that the processing exporters are concentrated in labor intensive sectors and mainly invested
by Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs). The presence of pure exporters distinguishes China from
developed countries. There are no so-called pure exporters in U.S or France (Bernard and Jensen,
1999; Eaton et al., 2011). The goal of this paper is to incorporate the relevance of pure exporters into
the heterogeneous firms literature to further strengthen its explanatory power for developing countries.
By doing so, we propose an extension of Melitz (2003) general equilibrium model into an asymmet-
ric two-country setting. Heterogeneous Chinese firms may choose to operate in either processing trade
or regular production regimes, based on their idiosyncratic productivity. However, firms in foreign
country(e.g. the U.S) can only pursue regular production mode. This asymmetric assumption matches
the fact that processing trade is only implemented in developing countries. We also introduce fixed
domestic trade costs, which could induce firms to export but not serve the domestic market, especially
for firms which have cheap export costs. These two assumptions capture the salient features of pro-
cessing trade in China. To operate in processing trade, firms in China need to fully withdraw from the
domestic market and sell all of their output in foreign market in order to benefit from policies such as a
host of tax concessions. In other words, there is no domestic trade costs associated with pure exporters
as products manufactured by them are not allowed to be sold in the Chinese market. Additionally, as
processing exporters passively receive orders from foreign buyers, without the need to investigate the
foreign markets and outreach to potential foreign buyers, the fixed export costs are also neglected.
The aforementioned model is able to reproduce many characteristics of export patterns of Chinese
firms emphasized by recent micro-level studies 4. We show that the presence of domestic trade costs
along with the enforcement of processing trade generate processing exporters in China. Firms with both
domestic and foreign market have the highest production efficiency, followed by firms with domestic
sales, and finally by pure exporters. This model also allows us to explore how the impact of trade
liberalization is distributed across different types of firms. Specifically, reductions in export trade
4Zhang et al. (2009) using firm-level manufacturing data from Jiangsu province document that productivity indeed
serves as a key determinant of export success, but export did not improve firms’ performance. By using nearly 3 million
industrial firms over the period 1998-2007. Li and Yin (2009) ascertain that non-exporters are more productive than
exporters and there is a negative correlation between being an exporter and firm’s productivity. Lu et al. (2010) have
found evidence that foreign affiliates exporters in China are less productive than non-exporters.
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barriers induce better-performing regular firms benefit from globalization through expanding market;
while worse-performing regular firms suffer from globalization through contracting market. The least
productive pure exporters in China are forced to exit the market, and there is a revenue loss for surviving
firms that only serve the foreign market. Each of these responses reallocates resources toward more
productive firms and generates improvement in aggregate productivity levels.
Trade liberalization in variable trade costs delivers very similar effects to falling export barriers.
High-productive regular exporting firms experience increased revenue through greater foreign sales. The
most efficient domestic regular firms are able to overcome the cost of entering exporting market, thereby
inducing the entry of new regular exporters in both countries. In contrast, the rapidly falling transport
cost forces the least productive Chinese regular firms to switch from the regular production mode to
processing trade, and attract even less productive Chinese firms into processing trade regime, which
leads to the expansion of pure exporters. In other words, low efficient manufacturers might benefit
from falling transportation costs. Implementing processing trade in China potentially allows producers
that would have otherwise been forced to exit firms to pursue cross-border operations and gain from
trade. Furthermore, trade generates aggregate productivity gains for firms in the foreign country as
low-productive firms exit and high-productive firms expand. The overall industrial productivity of
Chinese firms after trade liberalization is ambiguous.
Our analysis related to fixed domestic trade barriers imply that productivity constrained firms, and
presumably the segmented domestic market as a whole, might be stuck in low value-added stages of sup-
ply chain and unable to pursue more profitable opportunities. Integrating the Chinese domestic market
might be thus an important prerequisite for moving into higher value-added, more profitable activi-
ties. Our results indicate that these effects can be sizable. Reducing the domestic trade protectionism
would increase aggregate welfare and expand the total varieties for consumption. This conclusion also
sheds light on the gains from falling domestic trade costs in the context of heterogeneous firms. First,
reducing impediment to interprovincial trade could facilitate access to the domestic market. The most
productive pure exporters would find it profitable to enter the domestic market as domestic trade costs
fall, thereby more domestic Chinese firms enter the local market. This, in turn, implies the expansion
in the range of product varieties available to Chinese consumers. Second, as low efficient pure exporters
exit and high efficient ones pursue regular production mode, the mass of firms engaging in processing
trade declines. This is particularly beneficial for China, which could substantially reduce the heavy
reliance on processing trade for growth. As is pointed out in Wong (2012), since domestic trade is
almost as twice as large as international trade in the Chinese economy, it could overtake international
trade as the more important driver of China’s growth if the decline in domestic barriers were to accel-
erate. Furthermore, a unified national market could boost the domestic demand and keep the Chinese
economy expanding while overseas markets remain weak.
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Our model can also be used to evaluate the welfare consequences of increased exposure to trade
in the presence of pure exporters. Trade liberalization and domestic integration unequivocally lead
to welfare gains. However, the welfare improvement generated by a reduction in variable trade costs
is counteracted by the distortion stemmed from the expanded number of pure exporters operating in
China. The accession to WTO in 2001 triggered a sharp rise in the processing trade, which have become
the major component of China’s export and the essential vehicle of China’s trade surge in 2000s. To
this end, our model is well-suited to explain the observed empirical pattern that falling transport costs
are related to the increasing number of pure exporters in China.
More broadly, our analysis contributes to the following strand of literature. It speaks to the emerging
research on export-platform foreign direct investment (FDI) i.e. on MNEs that process their final goods
in developing countries (Helpman et al., 2004; Yeaple, 2009). The contribution is that we include a
better understanding of how and why firms operate at different stages along the value added chain.
There has also been increased interest in the cost and benefits resulting from China’s processing trade
regime (Fu, 2011; Ma et al., 2009) as well as to the large body of research investigating the welfare
implication of export processing zones and duty drawbacks (Fernandes and Tang, 2013; Manova, 2013).
Through our novel mechanism of choice of trade regime, less efficient firms in labor-abundant countries
are very likely stuck in processing trade. To this line of research, we illustrate productivities constraint
impede firms’ export outcomes and profits. Our analysis of pure exporters is also related to the
literature studying trade policy in a heterogeneous-firm setting (Defever and Riao, 2012; Lu et al.,
2014; Fan et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2014). From this point, our theoretical model demonstrates that the
reallocation process is hindered, and that trade liberalization does not generate aggregate productivity
gains in industries when processing trade is pervasive.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background on processing
trade regime in China. After developing the model with heterogeneous firms in Section 3, we carry
out an analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on productivity cutoffs and welfare in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In the hopes of obtaining foreign technology, utilizing abundant labor force and boosting economic
growth, China has employed a wide range of trade instruments to stimulate export activity and FDI
since the beginning of the 1980s. A key intervention is the attraction of FIEs carrying out processing
trade. In place since the 1980s, the provision of this policy has resulted in a far-reaching reshuﬄe of
industrial production at the world level. China has become a world factory and climbed to the top
of the world exporters, contributing for more than ten percent of the global trade volume (the sum
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of exports and imports) in 2010. Most importantly, processing trade constitutes almost one-half of
China’s total trade and becomes the major contributor to China’s trade surplus.
The prevalence of processing trade can be directly attributed to the following factors: the estab-
lishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) 5 and the attraction of FDI. In the 1980s, the Chinese authority
selected some coastal cities as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to stimulate trade. FIEs were strongly
encouraged to locate in these zones to engage in processing trade. Additionally, the export-oriented
firm (with the export volume more than fifty percent) invested by foreign investors likewise granted ad-
ditional benefits such as reduced corporate income tax rate, preferential land-use policies, easier access
to finance and foreign market. In particular, enterprises located in SEZs were free to use the Chinese
vast pool of low cost labor, which was different from the prevailing Chinese lifetime system of public
or collective firms. These polices have proven to be highly effective, resulting in the increase of China’s
share in world trade from 1.1 percent to 1.9 percent by the end of 1989.
Since the 1990s, the labor-intensive stage of industrial production has been relocated from high-wage
countries to low-wage countries, which have specialized in assembly. In order to actively participate in
this new form of division of labor and integrate into the global production network, China deepened
its trade reform and broadened the opening-up in early of 1992. Policies with the similar privileges
were extended to inland and western provinces. Various economic development zones and high-tech
development zones were also established in central and western China. In addition, China progressively
lowered foreign investors’ import duties and entry barriers. These measures have led to impressive FDI
flows to China and given rise to the massive investment in manufacturing industry. FIEs accelerate the
Chinese manufacturing industry into the global production chain as they fragmented large parts of their
production processes via arms-length contracts or subsidiaries in China. Notably, FIEs overwhelmingly
accounted for seventy percent of processing trade in China in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
This highlights the essential role of foreign firms in China’s ballooning trade surplus.
The most direct and profound policy in promoting processing trade and enhancing export is the
establishment of a series of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the year 2000, one year before China
joined the WTO. Chinese private firms, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and FIEs are all encouraged
to locate in the EPZs, but all firms are only allowed to engage in processing trade. The production
inputs entering the EPZs are duty free and the final assembled product for export are exempted from
value added tax. Furthermore, firms also enjoy other preferential policies as streamlined regulations,
minimal administrative costs and finance facilities. In other words, the EPZs in China are very simple
zones that have the highest levels of openness in the country (Fu and Gao, 2007). However, in order
5The FTZs in China include: Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Economics and Technological Development
Zones (ETDZs), High-Technology Industrial Development Zones (HTIDZs), Export Processing Zones (EPZs), Open
coastal/riverside/inland/borader city, Border Economic Cooperation Zone (BECZ), Bounded Zone/Logistics Park.
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to obtain these benefits, all firms located in the EPZs must export seventy percent of their output.
The set up of the EPZs substantially encourages MNEs to transfer their labor intensive stage to China.
The aggressive expansion of EPZs in China has led to a great leap forward in China’s foreign trade,
accounting for almost nine percent of world export in 2008.
In summary, the creation of processing trade regime has significantly contributed to the growth of
China’s export activity. Foreign firms are the key determinants to the expansion of processing trade.
The establishment of a large number of FTZs further consolidates its superior export performance.
3 Theoretical Framework
The model extends Melitz (2003) to a world of two large asymmetric countries, China and Foreign
Country indexed by i ∈ {c, f} accordingly. Each country is populated by Li identical household. Labor
is the only factor of production. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns wage
wi. We assume that China is a labor-abundant country, having a lower wage than that of the Foreign
Country (wc < wf ). The size of the two economies is equal (Lc = Lf = L).
3.1 Demand
The preferences of a representative consumer in country i are given by a CES utility function over a
continuum of goods indexed by ω:
Ui =
[∫
ω∈Ωi
qi(ω)
ρdω
] 1
ρ
, i ∈ {c, f} (1)
where the measure of the set Ωi represents the mass of available varieties in country i. These goods
are substitutes, which implies 0 < ρ < 1 with the elasticity of substitution between any two pair of
goods having σ = 11−ρ > 1. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1975), consumer behavior can be modeled by
considering the set of varieties consumed as an aggregate good Qi ≡ Ui associated with an aggregate
price in country i
Pi =
[∫
ω∈Ωi
pi(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
. (2)
The assumption of CES preference implies that the consumer has ”taste for variety” in that she/he
prefers to consume a diversified bundle of goods. Moreover, even if each variety is priced differently,
adding a new one increases utility if prices of the existing varieties are unchanged. Given these presences,
the revenue of a variety ω in country i is:
ri(ω) = Ri
[
pi(ω)
Pi
]1−σ
, (3)
where Ri = PiQi =
∫
ω∈Ωi ri(ω)dω is the aggregate expenditure in country i; pi(ω) denotes the price of
variety ω in the domestic market i; the price index Pi summarizes the prices of competing varieties.
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3.2 Production
There is a continuum of firms, each choosing to produce a different variety ω with productivity ϕ.
Production involves fixed overhead costs and variable costs in each period. Production requires only
one factor, labor, which is inelastically supplied at its aggregate level Li, an index of the country i’s
size. A firm in country i pays the fixed market access costs fxwi to serve consumers in country j. We
denote the fixed costs of serving domestic market by fdwi, which includes ”market access” costs into
the domestic market 6. Exporting involves symmetric iceberg trade costs, where τ ≥ 1 units of a good
must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive. All firms in both countries face the fixed overhead
costs fwi, and vary in firm productivity, ϕ ∈ (0,∞).
In particular, a Chinese firm chooses to either pursue processing trade or regular production mode.
A pure exporter engages in processing trade which exports all of their product by paying beachhead
costs fwc. On the other hand, a regular producer that has the capability to cover beachhead costs fwc
and domestic trade costs fdwc serves the Chinese domestic market. Some of these regular producers
that are able to pay the additional fixed export costs fxwc exporting to Foreign Country. Notably, we
assume that firms in Foreign Country only operate domestically or as regular exporters.
Pure exporters are engaged in processing trade, and it is only implemented in China. Under this
regime, the duty of the imported input is waived and the processed goods are not allowed to be sold
in the Chinese market. Pure exporters in China thus pay for all domestic and manufactured input and
labor, and foreign buyers are responsible for the marketing and distribution of the final goods. In other
words, pure exporters only need to bear the production costs fwc and the iceberg trade costs τ > 1 of
transportation. The fixed domestic trade costs fdwc and the fixed export costs fxwc are waived from
their cost structure owing to the definition of processing trade. This is the key assumption which fits
the empirical findings that processing trade is prevalent in developing country e.g. China. By contrast,
the up-front expenditures are highest for a ordinary exporter that bears all domestic trade costs fdwc,
export distribution outlays associated with production fwc and trade fdwc. A firm that only serves
the domestic market has lower up-front expenses as it entails beachhead cost fwc and domestic trade
barriers fdwc.
Firm technology is represented by a cost function which exhibits constant marginal cost with some
fixed costs. The labor used is thus a linear function of output q:
l =
(
F +
q
ϕ
)
wi, (4)
where F ∈ {f, f + fd, f + fd + fx}. The profit maximization yields the standard condition that a firm’s
6As stated by (Melitz and Redding, 2012), with positive domestic access costs, it can be profitable in principle for firms
to export but not to serve the domestic market .
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output price is a constant markup over its marginal cost:
psc(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
τ
ϕ
wc,
pdc(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
1
ϕ
wc,
pxc (ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
τ
ϕ
wc,
(5)
where psc(ϕ) is the price charged by a Chinese pure exporter in Foreign Country; p
d
c(ϕ) is the price
charged by a domestic Chinese firm in its own market, and pxc (ϕ) is the price charged by a regular
Chinese exporter in Foreign Country. All exporting firms face the traditional iceberg transportation
costs where τ > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at its destination.
Substituting the pricing rule into firm revenue (3), we obtain the following expression of a Chinese
firm revenue in a different market:
rsc(ϕ) = (τwc)
1−σRf
(
Pfρϕ
)σ−1
,
rdc (ϕ) = w
1−σ
c Rc
(
Pcρϕ
)σ−1
,
rxc (ϕ) = (wcτ)
1−σRf
(
Pfϕρ
)σ−1
,
(6)
where rsc(ϕ) stands for the total revenue of a Chinese pure exporter gained in Foreign Country; the
equilibrium revenue of a Chinese regular producer in the domestic market is rdc (ϕ), and in the export
market is rxc (ϕ) .
Let k ∈ {d, x, s} index the three possible modes of production: domestic, regular and pure export
respectively. The maximum level of profits that a Chinese firm with productivity ϕ using operation
mode k can attain is given by:
pikc (ϕ) =

rdc (ϕ)
σ − (fd + f)wc only serves the domestic market
rdc (ϕ)
σ +
rxc (ϕ)
σ − (fd + fx + f)wc serves both markets
rsc(ϕ)
ϕ − fwc only serves the Foreign Country
The departure of my model from Melitz (2003) is the additional assumption in the domestic trade
costs fd. In Melitz (2003), an integrated domestic market which involves no trade costs is assumed.
Owing to the cost saving advantage, less-productive firms earn nonnegative profits exclusively from the
domestic market. Such an assumption is reasonable since conducting international business is much
harder than building business relations in its home market in a unified market. However, Chinese
domestic market is segmented by provincial border; the productivity premium is also needed to enter
other domestic provincial markets. The best example is by Naughton (2000), which states that local
government not block the border or impose any tariffs. But the government’s pervasive political power
enables it to impose significant non-tariff barriers 7 to outside firms which can substantially increase
7The types of domestic trade barriers include physical barriers, outright prohibition through administrative decree,
financial benefits for firms selling local goods, local purchasing quotas, poor infrastructure and business conditions, less
efficient government (Wong, 2012; Pflu¨ger and Russek, 2013).
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the costs of trade and cross-provincial border investments. Regardless of the form of the barriers,
these non-tariff barriers are widely employed as trade impediments in domestic trade 8. Therefore,
generalized the current theoretical model to capture the salient feature of high domestic trade costs fd
is very reasonable.
Foreign firms are similar to Chinese firms. The price charged by a foreign firm in its domestic
market is pdf =
σ
σ−1
1
ϕwf . The price of a product from Foreign Country exported to the Chinese market
is pxf =
σ
σ−1
τ
ϕwf . Thus, the revenue earned from domestic sales and export sales to the Chinese market
are, respectively, rdf (ϕ) = w
1−σ
f Rf
(
Pfρϕ
)σ−1
and rxf (ϕ) = (wfτ)
1−σRc
(
Pcϕρ
)σ−1
, where Ri and Pi
denote the aggregate expenditure and price index in country i ∈ {c, f}. The combined revenue of a
foreign firm, rf (ϕ), thus depends on its export status:
rf (ϕ) =
{
rdf (ϕ) if the firm does not export
rdf (ϕ) + r
x
f (ϕ) if the firm exports.
As illustrated before, foreign firms can only operate domestically or as regular exporters, therefore,
no foreign firms ever export and not also produce for its domestic market. Each firm’s profit is separated
into portions earned from domestic sales pidf (ϕ) and export sales pi
x
f (ϕ) by accounting the entirely
overhead production costs in domestic profit:
pidf (ϕ) =
rdf (ϕ)
σ
− (fd + f)wf ; pixf (ϕ) =
rxf (ϕ)
σ
− fxwf .
A foreign firm that produces for its domestic market and exports if pixf (ϕ) ≥ 0. Each firm’s combined
profits can then be written as pif (ϕ) = pi
d
f (ϕ) + max{0, pixf (ϕ)}.
3.3 Firm Entry, Exit and Export Status
To produce in country i ∈ {c, f}, firms must make an initial investment fewi > 0 (measure in units
of labor), which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their productivity ϕ from a distribution g(ϕ),
with cumulative distribution G(ϕ), which is assumed to be common across countries. Firms then face
an exogenous probability of death each period δ. An entering firm with productivity ϕ would then
immediately exit if its profit level is negative, or would produce and earn pii ≥ 0, i ∈ {c, f} in every
period until it is hit with the bad shock and is forced to exit. Assuming that there is no time discounting,
each firm’s value function is given by:
vi(ϕ) = max
{
0,
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tpii(ϕ)
}
= max
{
0,
1
δ
pii(ϕ)
}
.
8Domestic trade barriers are not specific to China. For example, in Russia, regional government limits beer import
from other regions (Wong, 2012; Guriev et al., 2007).
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Thus, ϕ∗i = inf{ϕ : vi(ϕ) > 0} identifies the lowest productivity level (hereafter referred to as the cutoff
level) of producing firms. Since pii(0) = −f is negative, pii(ϕ∗) must be equal to zero. This will be
referred to as the zero cutoff profit condition.
In particularly, a Chinese firm obtains the information about its productivity level ϕ once the fixed
entry costs fewc are paid. The cutoff productivity levels ϕ
∗
s, ϕ
∗
d and ϕ
∗
x that identify pure exporters,
domestic firms and regular exporters:
ϕ∗σ−1s =
σfwc
Rf
(
τwc
Pf
σ
σ−1
)1−σ , (7)
ϕ∗σ−1d =
σ(f + fd)wc
Rc
(
wc
Pc
σ
σ−1
)1−σ , (8)
ϕ∗σ−1x =
σfxwc
Rf
(
τwc
Pf
σ
σ−1
)1−σ . (9)
These three cutoffs are, respectively, the productivity level above which a Chinese firm would find
it profitable to produce solely for Foreign Country {pisc(ϕ) = 0}, and the productivity level necessary
for a firm to choose to become a domestic producer {pidc (ϕ) = 0}. Additionally, ϕ∗x= inf {ϕ : ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d
and pixc (ϕ) > 0} represents the cutoff productivity level for regular exporting Chinese firms.
fewc
Processing Trade Regime
ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d
Serve the Domestic Market
Serve the Foreign Market
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d
Figure 1: Firms’ production mode in China
As shown in Figure 1, successful entrants choose to engage in processing trade or regular production
mode based on their idiosyncratic productivity. In accordance with the empirical evidence that Chinese
pure exporters are the least efficient surviving firms and exporters tend to be more productive than
domestic firms, we must have
τσ−1fRcP σ−1c < (f + fd)RfP
σ−1
f < τ
σ−1fxRcP σ−1c , (10)
which recaps the partitioning of firms 0 < ϕ∗s < ϕ∗d < ϕ
∗
x. That is, a Chinese firm, the productivity of
which covering the fixed production cost serves Foreign Country only. A Chinese firm, the productivity
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of which is able to pay for the production and fixed domestic trade costs, chooses to serve the domestic
market. A Chinese firm drawing a sufficiently high productivity chooses to serve both markets.
Any entering Chinese firm drawing a productivity level ϕ < ϕ∗s immediately exit and never pro-
duce. The equilibrium productivity distribution µc(ϕ) of Chinese firms is determined by the initial
productivity draw, conditional on successful entry:
µc(ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗s) if ϕ ≥ ϕ
∗
s
0 otherwise
and pinc ≡ 1 − G(ϕ∗s) is the Chinese firms’ ex ante probability of successful entry to the industry.
Therefore, the average productivity levels of pure exporters ϕ˜sc(ϕ
∗
s), non-exporters ϕ˜
d
c(ϕ
∗
d), and regular
exporters ϕ˜xc (ϕ
∗
x) in China are defined as:
ϕ˜sc(ϕ
∗
s) =
[
1
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
∫ ϕ∗d
ϕ∗s
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
, (11)
ϕ˜dc(ϕ
∗
d) =
[
1
1−G(ϕ∗d)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
, (12)
ϕ˜xc (ϕ
∗
x) =
[
1
1−G(ϕ∗x)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
. (13)
These equations show how the shape of equilibrium distribution of productivity levels is tied to the
exogenous ex ante distribution g(ϕ) while allowing the range of productivity levels (indexed by the
cutoffs) to be endogenously determined (Melitz, 2003).
Chinese firms’ decisions concerning production for the domestic and foreign markets are summarized
graphically in Figure 2. In addition, psc =
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
1−G(ϕ∗s) denotes the probability of being pure exporters
conditional on successful entry. Similarly, pdc =
1−G(ϕ∗d)
1−G(ϕ∗s) represents the ex ante probability that one of
these successful firms engages in regular production mode; while pxc =
1−G(ϕ∗x)
1−G(ϕ∗d) denotes the probability
of exporting conditional on serving the domestic market. Furthermore, Mc is the mass of producing
firms and M ec is the mass of entrants in China. Consequently, the mass of pure exporters, domestic
firms and exporting firms in China are represented by M sc = p
s
cMc, M
d
c = p
d
cMc, and M
x
c = p
x
cM
d
c ,
respectively.
ϕ∗s ϕ∗d ϕ
∗
x ϕ ∈ (0,∞)
Firm exit
Pure Exporters
Produce for Chinese market only
Produce for both markets
Figure 2: Zero-profit, pure exporting and regular exporting productivity in China
Foreign firms follow the conventional pattern in literature. Once the sunk costs of entry fewf are
paid, a firm draw its productivity ϕ from a fixed distribution g(ϕ). There are two cutoff productivities,
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the domestic zero profit productivity, ϕ∗df , above which firms produce for their own domestic market;
and the exporting productivity cutoff, ϕ∗xf , above which firms serve both markets:
ϕ∗σ−1df =
σ(f + fd)wf
Rf
(
wf
Pf
σ
σ−1
)1−σ , (14)
ϕ∗σ−1xf =
σfxwf
Rc
(
τwf
Pc
σ
σ−1
)1−σ . (15)
The conventional sorting condition of selection into export market (ϕ∗xf > ϕ
∗
df ) requires strictly positive
fixed exporting costs and sufficient high values of both fixed and variable trade costs: τσ−1fxRfP σ−1f >
(f + fd)RcP
σ−1
c . In this sense, the revenue needed to serve the export market is larger relative to the
revenue needed to cover the domestic trade costs.
ϕ∗df ϕ
∗
xf ϕ ∈ (0,∞)
Firm exit
Produce for Foreign Country only
Produce for both markets
Figure 3: Zero-profit and exporting productivity in Foreign Country.
Foreign firms’ decision concerning production for their own domestic market and Chinese market
are summarized graphically in Figure 3. Of the mass of foreign firms, Mf , G(ϕ
∗
df ), draw a productivity
level sufficient low that they are unable to cover any costs and exit the industry immediately; a fraction,
G(ϕ∗xf )−G(ϕ∗df ), draw an intermediate productivity such that they could afford the costs of production
and domestic trade barriers and serve its own domestic market; a fraction, 1−G(ϕ∗xf ), has a sufficient
high productivity level that it is profitable to serve both markets. Once again, the equilibrium distri-
bution of productivity for incumbent firms, µf (ϕ) = g(ϕ)/[1 −G(ϕ∗df )] ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗df , is determined by ex
ante probability of firm productivity based on successful entry. The ex ante probability of exporting to
China is then pxf =
1−G(ϕ∗xf )
1−G(ϕ∗df ) . Accordingly, the aggregate productivity levels for foreign domestic firms
and exporters are defined as:
ϕ˜df (ϕ
∗
df ) =
[
1
1−G(ϕ∗df )
∫ ∞
ϕ∗df
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
, (16)
ϕ˜xf (ϕ
∗
xf ) =
[
1
1−G(ϕ∗xf )
∫ ∞
ϕ∗xf
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
. (17)
Analogously to China, the total number of producing firms is denoted by Mf and the mass of
exporting firms is Mxf = p
x
fMf in Foreign Country. However, the total number of firms competing in
Foreign Country is Mf +M
s
c +M
x
c , which implies the mass of producing firms is not equal to the total
varieties available to consumers in Foreign Country (Mf 6= M sc +Mxc +Mf ). Similarly, the total mass of
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varieties available to consumers in China is Mdc +M
x
f , which indicates the total varieties that produced
in China is not equal to the total varieties available to the Chinese consumer (Mc 6= Mdc +Mxf ).
The construction of productivity averages in both regions ((11))-(13) and (16)-(17)) can also be
used to express the average profit and revenue across different types of firms: rsc(ϕ˜
s
c) and pi
s
c(ϕ˜
s
c)
represent the average revenue and profit earned by Chinese pure exporters from sales in Foreign Country.
Nevertheless, rdi (ϕ˜
d
i ) and pi
d
i (ϕ˜
d
i ) describe the average revenue and profit obtained by domestic firms in
their own country; similarly rxi (ϕ˜
x
i ) and pi
x
i (ϕ˜
x
i ) depict the average export revenue and profit earned by
domestic regular exporters. The overall average, across all types of firms, of combined revenue, earned
from both markets, is thus given by:
r¯c = p
s
cσfwc
(
ϕ˜sc
ϕ∗s
)σ−1
+ pdcσwc
[
(f + fd)
(
ϕ˜dc
ϕ∗d
)σ−1
+ pxcfx
(
ϕ˜xc
ϕ∗x
)σ−1]
,
r¯f = σ(f + fd)wf
(
ϕ˜df
ϕ∗df
)σ−1
+ pxfσfxwf
(
ϕ˜xf
ϕ∗xf
)σ−1
.
The partitioning of firms by export status in both countries can be obtained if and only if τσ−1f <
f + fd < τ
σ−1fx, which requires RfP σ−1f = RcP
σ−1
c is satisfied. That is, beachhead costs with variable
export costs are relatively small to production costs plus the domestic trade barriers, while export
trade costs must be above a domestic productivity threshold, based on RfP
σ−1
f = RcP
σ−1
c is holding.
Satisfying these conditions could make the model generate partitioning of the coexistence, within a
narrowly defined industry, of pure exporters, domestic firms and regular exporters. More importantly,
the holding of RfP
σ−1
f = RcP
σ−1
c draws special attention. Substituting the total revenue Ri with total
labor income Ri = wiL and wc < wf yields P
σ−1
f < P
σ−1
c and Rf > Rc. That is, the price index in
China, Pc, is high relative to the foreign price index, Pf , and Foreign Country has a lower true cost of
living index and a higher utility level relative to China (Uf > Uc). In other words, as a consequence
of a very large proportion of processing trade, Chinese consumers are faced with higher prices while
foreign consumers reap the benefits of cheap processed goods.
3.4 Equilibrium Conditions
The zero cutoff profit conditions in both countries imply a relationship between the average profit per
firm and the cutoff productivity levels:
pisc(ϕ
∗
s) = 0 ⇐⇒ pisc(ϕ˜sc) = fwck(ϕ∗s),
pidc (ϕ
∗
d) = 0 ⇐⇒ pidc (ϕ˜dc) = (f + fd)wck(ϕ∗d),
pixc (ϕ
∗
x) = 0 ⇐⇒ pixc (ϕ˜xc ) = fxwck(ϕ∗x),
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where k(ϕ) = [(ϕ˜(ϕ)/ϕ)σ−1 − 1]. The expression for the corresponding variables for foreign firms are
defined analogously;
pidf (ϕ
∗
df ) = 0 ⇐⇒ pidf (ϕ˜df ) = (f + fd)wfk(ϕ∗df ),
pixf (ϕ
∗
xf ) = 0 ⇐⇒ pixf (ϕ˜xf ) = fxwfk(ϕ∗xf ).
The zero cutoff profit conditions also imply that all other cutoff productivity levels can be written as
a function of domestic cutoff productivity:
rsc(ϕ
∗
s)
rdc (ϕ
∗
d)
= τ1−σ
(ϕ∗s
ϕ∗d
)σ−1
=
f
f + fd
⇐⇒ ϕ∗s = ϕ∗dτ
( f
f + fd
) 1
σ−1 , (18)
rxc (ϕ
∗
x)
rdc (ϕ
∗
d)
= τ1−σ
(ϕ∗x
ϕ∗d
)σ−1
=
fx
f + fd
⇐⇒ ϕ∗x = ϕ∗dτ
( fx
f + fd
) 1
σ−1 , (19)
rxf (ϕ
∗
xf )
rdf (ϕ
∗
df )
= τ1−σ
(ϕ∗xf
ϕ∗df
)σ−1
=
fx
f + fd
⇐⇒ ϕ∗xf = ϕ∗dfτ
( fx
f + fd
) 1
σ−1 . (20)
Hence, the average profit flow for a surviving firm in China and Foreign Country are, respectively,
p¯ic = p
s
cpi
s
c(ϕ˜
s
c) + p
d
c(pi
d
c (ϕ˜
d
c) + p
x
cpi
x
c (ϕ˜
x
c ))
= pscfwck(ϕ
∗
s) + p
d
c((f + fd)wck(ϕ
∗
d) + p
x
cfxwck(ϕ
∗
xf )), (ZCP1)
p¯if = pi
d
f (ϕ˜
d
f ) + p
x
fpi
x
f (ϕ˜
x
f ),
= (f + fd)wfk(ϕ
∗
df ) + p
x
ffxwfk(ϕ
∗
x), (ZCP2)
where all other cutoff productivity levels and fractions of exporting firms are implicitly defined as a
function of domestic cutoff level using equations (18)− (20). These two equations thus identify the zero
cutoff profit conditions for China and Foreign Country.
3.5 Determination of the Equilibrium
The potential entrants enter the industry until the expected value of entry, Vi, equals the sunk entry
costs, fewi. The expected value of entry Vi is the ex ante probability of successful entry, 1 − G(ϕi),
multiplied by the expected profits of producing goods until death. Hence, the free entry conditions for
China and Foreign Country are
Vc =
1−G(ϕ∗s)
δ
p¯ic = fewc, (FE1)
Vf =
1−G(ϕ∗df )
δ
p¯if = fewf , (FE2)
where p¯ii is the average firm profit from successful entry. In particular, some low-productivity Chinese
firms fully export to Foreign Country, while some intermediate-productivity Chinese firms concentrate
on domestic market. With the definition of weighted average productivity above, the free entry condi-
tions in China and Foreign Country can be rewritten as a function solely of the zero profit productivity
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and parameters of the model:
fe =
f
δ
J(ϕ∗s) +
f + fd
δ
J(ϕ∗d) +
fx
δ
J(ϕ∗x), (21)
fe =
f + fd
δ
J(ϕ∗df ) +
fx
δ
J(ϕ∗xf ), (22)
J(ϕ∗s) =
∫ ϕ∗d
ϕ∗s
[( ϕ
ϕ∗s
)σ−1−1]g(ϕ)dϕ, J(ϕ∗i ) = ∫ ∞
ϕ∗i
[( ϕ
ϕ∗i
)σ−1−1]g(ϕ)dϕ.
Using the relationship between productivity cutoffs (18) − (20), and noting that J(·) is a decreasing
function, the above free entry conditions identify unique equilibrium values of domestic cutoffs for China
and Foreign Country (ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df ). These in turn determine export productivity cutoffs (ϕ
∗
s, ϕ
∗
x and
ϕ∗xf ) as well as average productivity levels and the ex ante successful entry and export probabilities.
In addition, the increase in fixed production costs, f , fixed domestic trade costs, fd, and fixed export
costs, fx, raise the productivity cutoff levels ϕ
∗
d and ϕ
∗
df in both regions. The higher fixed costs indicate
that firms must draw a higher productivity to earn sufficient revenue to overcome these costs. On the
other hand, raising these costs reduce the mass of goods produced, improve firms’ex post profitability,
and therefore increases the probability of less productive firms surviving in the industry.
In a stationary equilibrium with constant mass of operating firms, the mass of successful new
entrants must equal the mass of incumbents that die: [1 − G(ϕ∗i )]M ei = δMi. Product variety in a
destination is given by the total mass of sellers. Hence, the price index in China and Foreign Country
is the CES aggregate of the prices of all of these goods:
Pc =
[
Mdc p
d
c(ϕ˜
d
c)
1−σ +Mxf p
x
f (ϕ˜
x
f )
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
, (23)
Pf =
[
Mfp
d
f (ϕ˜
d
f )
1−σ +Mxc p
x
c (ϕ˜
x
c )
1−σ +M sc p
s
c(ϕ˜
s
c)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
, (24)
where Mki is the mass of operating firm choosing production mode k in country i. Notice that M
s
c
denotes the varieties produced by Chinese pure exporters but only consumed in Foreign Country. As a
result, the price indices vary across these two regions.
The comparison of industry cutoff productivity (7) and domestic productivity thresholds in China
(8) and Foreign Country (14) reveals ϕ∗s < ϕ∗d < ϕ
∗
df . This implies that firms located in Foreign Country
have better accesses to obtaining a productivity above any cutoff level, and that only more productive
firms can survive. In other words, ex ante Chinese firms draw lower productivity levels relative to
their counterpart in Foreign Country. The productivity cutoff level of surviving Foreign firms, ϕ∗df ,
is therefore higher than ϕ∗s. Foreign firms face more severe competition both from Chinese pure and
regular exporters compared to that faced by Chinese firms in its own market, result in ϕ∗x < ϕ∗xf .
In particular, firms in Foreign Country with better productivity distribution is associated with higher
productivity, a lower price index and a higher welfare per worker relative to that of China. These results
fit the empirical feature that China is a technology inferior country relative to developed countries e.g.
the U.S.
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The labor market clearing condition requires that, in both countries, total labor used for production
and the investment (by new entrants) must equal the total labor endowment
L = M ei fe +Mi
(∫
lki (ϕ)dµi(ϕ)
)
, i ∈ {c, f},
where µi(ϕ) is the ex post distribution of operating firms across productivity levels in country i, and l
k
i
is the optimal labor demand for a firm with productivity ϕ using production mode k in country i. The
mass of producing firms, Mi, can be determined from the ratio of aggregate revenue, Ri, to average
firm revenue:
Mc =
Rc
r¯c
=
L
σ
(
pscf
(
ϕ˜sc
ϕ∗s
)σ−1
+ pdc
[
(f + fd)
(
ϕ˜dc
ϕ∗d
)σ−1
+ pxcfx
(
ϕ˜xc
ϕ∗x
)σ−1]) , (25)
Mf =
Rf
r¯f
=
L
σ
(
(f + fd)
(
ϕ˜df
ϕ∗df
)σ−1
+ pxffx
(
ϕ˜xf
ϕ∗xf
)σ−1) . (26)
Other things equal, the rise in average productivity following the opening of trade reduces the mass
of domestically produced varieties. The trade balance condition is derived from labor market clearing,
free entry, zero-profit productivity cutoff conditions and the requirement that trade is balanced:
rfc (ϕ˜
x
c )M
x
c + r
s
c(ϕ˜
s
c)M
s
c = r
x
f (ϕ˜
x
f )M
x
f . (27)
To put it more simply, the total value of China’s manufacturing export must equal the value of manu-
facturing import produced by foreign firms.
The equilibrium is referenced by a vector of variables in China and Foreign Country: {ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x, ϕ∗df , ϕ∗xf}.
All other endogenous variables (Mc,Mf , Pc, Pf ) can be written as functions of these quantities such
that the labor market is clearing, free entry and aggregate expenditure equations are satisfied in both
countries and the balance trade condition holds. We showed in Appendix B.3 that there exists a unique
equilibrium.
4 Impact of Trade Liberalization
The preceding analysis has shown that the presence of processing trade along with the fixed domestic
trade costs and export entry costs can induce a partitioning of firms by export status, based on firm
productivity. Nevertheless, this result is not exactly earth-shattering. The current model is well-suited
to address several important issues concerning the impact of trade liberalization with the existence of
processing trade and firm heterogeneity: Do all firms within a sector benefit from trade, or does the
impact depend on a firm’s productivity? How are the aggregate productivity and welfare affected in
the presence of processing trade? What happens to the range of firm productivity levels? In particular,
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this model is much better suited to tackle several different mechanisms that would produce an increase
in trade exposure and plausibly correspond to the observed decreases in trade costs over time or some
specific policies to liberalized trade. The effects of such mechanisms are investigated: a decrease in
either fixed or variable export trade costs and a falling in domestic trade costs. These three scenarios
involve comparative statics of the open economy equilibrium with respect to fx, τ and fd. We show
that trade liberalization in fixed export costs force the least productive Chinese pure exporters to exit,
while simultaneously raises domestic productivity levels in both countries. Moreover, the increased
exposure to trade in τ generates very similar result for the decrease in fx. The only difference is that
the industry cutoff productivity level has decreased in China. In addition, a more integrated domestic
market forces the least productive Chinese pure exporters to exit and has an overall positive impact of
welfare in both regions. In summary, all these changes unequivocally deliver welfare gains and nations
always benefit from freer trade.
4.1 Decrease in Fixed Export Trade Costs
I first investigate the effects of a decrease in the fixed export costs fx. Throughout the comparative
static analysis, I haved used the old notation to describe the old equilibrium. I then added primes (′)
to all variables and functions when they pertain to the new equilibrium with f ′x < fx.
Proposition 1. A decrease in fixed export trade costs forces the least efficient firms to exit and therefore
generates productivity improvement in both regions. It also creates entry of new regular firms into the
export markets in both countries.
For Proof: See Appendix C.1.
ϕ∗s ϕ∗s
′ ϕ∗d ϕ∗d
′ ϕ∗x
′ ϕ∗x ϕ ∈ (0,∞)
Firm exit
Pure exporters
Produce for
the Chinese market only
Produce for both markets
Figure 4: The impact of falling fx on productivity cutoffs in China
Trade liberalization in foreign market access costs induces an increase in the industry cutoff pro-
ductivity levels in both countries and a decrease in regular export levels. Falling export costs fx drives
the least efficient pure exporters out of market ϕ∗s
′ > ϕ∗s. In particular, reductions in barriers to trade
lead to all surviving Chinese pure exporters incurring revenue and profits loss rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ). The re-
duction in profits from the foreign market causes some low-efficient pure exporters that were previously
marginal to exit the industry. As the low-productivity pure exporters exit, resources are reallocated
toward higher-productivity firms.
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With respect to the regular firms, the increased exposure to trade improves the productivity thresh-
olds of serving domestic markets: ϕ∗d
′ > ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df
′ > ϕ∗df in both countries. Notably, this causes the
least productive Chinese regular firms with productivity levels between ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
d
′ to no longer be able
to earn positive profits in the domestic market, and hence force to engage in processing trade, while the
least productive foreign firms (ϕ∗df ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗df ′) are forced to exit. Furthermore, all existing domestic
regular firms in both regions relinquish a portion of their domestic revenue: rdi
′
(ϕ) < rdi (ϕ), i ∈ {c, f}.
On the other hand, the decreased export thresholds (ϕxi decrease) generate entry of new firms into
the export market. Regular firms which do not export with high fx are then able to serve the foreign
market, and their combined sales increase with falling fx. Firms that already exported prior to the
change in fx not increase their combined revenue and profits. In general, trade liberalization therefore
reallocates revenue and profits away from the least efficient firms that exit toward more productive firms
that enter the regular export markets. The reallocations of revenue and profits generate an aggregate
productivity improvement and an increase in welfare in both countries. Figure 4 graphically represents
the changes in productivity cutoffs driven by falling fx in China.
4.2 Decrease in Variable Trade Costs
Proposition 2. Falling variable trade costs reduce the productivity cutoff of pure exporters and cause
the entry of more inefficient firms in China. The regular export cutoff productivity levels decrease as
well. On the contrary, declining iceberg costs induce an increase in the domestic cutoff productivity
levels in both regions.
For Proof: See Appendix C.2.
ϕ∗s
′ ϕ∗s ϕ∗d ϕ∗d
′ ϕ∗x
′ ϕ∗x ϕ ∈ (0,∞)
Firm exit
Pure exporters
Produce for
the Chinese market only
Produce for both markets
Figure 5: The impact of falling τ on productivity cutoffs in China
A decrease in the variable trade costs from τ to τ ′ distributes different effects to Chinese and foreign
firms. The evolution of firms in Foreign Country follows the conventional pattern as outlined by Melitz
(2003). The least productive foreign firms are forced to exit, and therefore the industrial productivity
cutoff level rises ϕ∗df
′ > ϕ∗df . In contrast, changes in τ shift down the export productivity cutoff level
ϕ∗xf
′ < ϕ∗xf . The increased exposure to trade generates entry of new regular firms into the export
market (that did not export with the higher τ). All firms lose a portion of their domestic sales, so
that the firms that do not export incur both a revenue and profit loss. The more productive firms
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that export more than make up for the loss of domestic sales with increased export sales, and the most
productive firms among this group also increase their profits: rdf
′
(ϕ) + rxf
′(ϕ) > rdf (ϕ) + r
x
f (ϕ).
On the other hand, the decline in variable trade costs distinctly impacts to the pure exporters and
regular firms in China. Falling iceberg trade costs τ raise the domestic cutoff level: ϕ∗d
′ > ϕ∗d, and
the aggregate domestic productivity in China. Regular firms previously producing with low produc-
tivity levels can no longer earn positive profits from regular production mode, and hence switch to
processing trade regime instead of exiting the industry. Furthermore, it also causes the entry of more
low-productive pure exporters in China. That is, the falling transport cost τ is particularly beneficial
for them as it creates more export opportunities, offers greater revenue and profits, and pays fewer
costs. As shown in Figure 5, this leads to more of the low-productive firms self-selecting into process-
ing trade: ϕ∗s
′ < ϕ∗s. In other words, a fall in transport costs promotes processing activities in China.
However, as more Chinese firms become pure exporters, a larger set of varieties produced by Chinese
firms with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗s ′, ϕ∗d′) becomes unavailable to Chinese consumers.
To put it more simply, greater openness raises ϕ∗d and thus decreases locally produced varieties.
Lower variable costs of trade produce an ”anti-variety” effect, i.e. the range of consumed variety
in China falls as trade becomes freer. On the contrary, Foreign Country experiences a ”pro-variety
effect”, as a greater number of varieties manufactured by Chinese pure exporters becomes available to
foreign consumers. Nevertheless, welfare always increases with trade freeness in both regions. Above
all, the increased labor demand (by the less productive firms and new entrants) causes the real wage
to increase. It therefore pulls more low-productive non-exporters switching into processing trade, as
these firms could not afford to cover the entry costs of domestic market. In particular, falling iceberg
costs and export trade barriers together help to explain the empirical feature that the export booms of
China are driven by the entry of processing firms into the export market. As documented in Yu and
Tian (2012); Defever and Riao (2012); Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci (2004) and Manova and Yu (2013),
the accession to WTO substantially reduced the average tariff to 9% and dramatically increased the
prevalence of processing trade in China, in which the share of pure exporters among all exporters
increased from 30.36% to 40.59% in 2006 and constitutes one-half of China’s total trade in 2000s.
4.3 Decrease in Domestic Trade Cost
Proposition 3. Falling domestic trade barriers raise the cutoff productivity level of pure exporters in
China, while decreasing the productivity thresholds of serving the domestic market in both regions. The
freer domestic trade also raises the export productivity cutoffs in both countries.
For Proof: See Appendix C.3.
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ϕ∗s ϕ∗s
′ ϕ∗d
′ ϕ∗d ϕ
∗
x ϕ∗x
′ ϕ ∈ (0,∞)
Firm exit
Pure exporters
Produce for the Chinese market only
Produce for both markets
Figure 6: The impact of falling fd on productivity cutoffs in China
Lowering domestic entry costs fd raises the industry cutoff productivity in China ϕ
∗
s
′ > ϕ∗s, and
thus forces the least efficient pure exporters to exit. The falling costs of entry into the domestic market
also forces all existing Chinese pure exporters to lose a portion of revenue obtained from Foreign
Country: rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ), ∀ ∈ ϕ[ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d). Conversely, falling domestic trade barriers decrease the
domestic cutoff productivity levels in both countries. In particular, the decline in domestic trade costs
in China substantially reduces the barriers of serving the domestic market, which creates the entry
of new domestic firms. The previously relative efficient pure exporters that were not able to pursue
regular production mode are capable of engaging in domestic trade with lower fd. In addition, these
new domestic producers benefit from the more integrated domestic market as their revenue and profits
increase. However, the successful entry of less productive pure exporters into the domestic market
contributes to an aggregate domestic productivity loss. Moreover, the factors of increased industry
cutoff productivity level and decreased domestic productivity threshold in China indicate that more
Chinese firms are operating in regular production mode, and thus the competition in the domestic
market is intensified. On the contrary, as fewer Chinese firms engage in processing trade, fewer varieties
are manufactured by Chinese pure exporters, which, in turn, result in fewer varieties being supplied to
foreign consumers.
Another way to gain insight into the impact of falling domestic barriers comes from the consumption
side. A falling in domestic costs decreases the domestic cutoff productivity levels and therefore reduces
the average profits of existing regular firms in both regions. The lower profit levels, in turn, imply
an increase in domestic variety. The incresing product variety and the decreasing aggregate domestic
productivity oppositely affect welfare. The appendix C.3.1 shows that the welfare change is positive
and hence that the expanding product variety effect dominates that of the lower aggregate domestic
productivity levels. This yields the reasonable property that lower domestic trade costs have an overall
positive impact on welfare. In other words, if the domestic impediments were to hasten, it could
alleviate our reliance on processing trade and help us avoid sticking in the low-valued added chain.
Figure 6 helps to visualize the effects of trade liberalization in fd on all types of firms’ productivity
cutoffs in China.
On the other hand, the decrease from fd to fd
′ induces an increase in the cutoff productivity
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levels of regular exporters (ϕxc , ϕ
x
f ↑)9. The more intense entry following from the decreased domestic
productivity thresholds in both countries enhances domestic product market competition and therefore
raises the equilibrium exporting productivity levels. In other words, the productivity of survival is
lowered while the exporting cutoff increases in China when facing domestic market integration.
The falling of domestic trade costs delivers very deep policy implications to China. Empirical
evidences (Wong, 2012; Naughton, 2000) from China have documented that China has a very segmented
domestic market; domestic firms incur domestic barriers to serve the local market. Some other studies
have demonstrated that the internal market fragmentation promotes China’s trade performance. Less
efficient Chinese firms, which are not able to overcome such costs, engage in processing trade as pure
exporters to full sell their output in foreign countries. That is, pure exporters enter the international
market as an alternative way to pursue economies of scale. In other words, the factors of the server
fragmented Chinese market teamed with the creation of processing trade distort Chinese firms export
performances, which not only generate a large scale of pure exporters but also contribute to the rapid
expansion of China’s export. Moreover, these elements also illustrate a cluster of processing trade in
eastern and southern China and coastal region prosperity.
Nevertheless, the highly fragmented domestic market has led to many Chinese firms only engaging in
processing trade and getting supplied OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) products for the global
buyers, but not able to establish a position in the international market for innovative and high-valued
added products. Although local protection measures may help lift local economies in the short term,
the distorted national market has spawned problems such as higher operation costs and overcapacity in
the wider economy, undermining the economies of scale of China’s huge market. Consequently, clearing
domestic market barriers, coupled with reducing export reliance on processing trade, could allow the
most productive ones to thrive, facilitate technology diffusion, improve productivity and ultimately
increase the competitiveness of firms and growth in China. To this end, our model offers a theoretical
basis for constructing an integrated Chinese domestic market. In particular, the removal of regional
blockades across the country to build a unified and open market system can allow productivity to play
a decisive role in allocating resources, and hence bring aggregate productivity growth when facing trade
liberalization. Furthermore, the results and intuitions presented here indicate that gains from more
liberalized trade could be larger for the more integrated internal market. This implies that China would
respond to more export opportunities resulting from falling trad barriers if the government can unify
9Melitz (2003) states that there is a transitional issue associated with the exporting status of firms with productivity
level between ϕxc and ϕ
x
c
′. The loss of export sales to counterpart (from rxc (ϕ) down to the r
x
c
′(ϕ)) is such that firms
entering with productivity levels between ϕxc and ϕ
x
c
′ will not export as the lower variable profit r
x
c
′(ϕ)
σ
no longer covers
the amortized portion of the entry cost fx. On the other hand, incumbent firms with productivity level in this range have
already incurred the sunk entry cost of export and have no reason to exit the export market until they are hit with the
bad shock and exit the industry. Eventually, all these incumbent firms exit and no firm with a productivity level in that
range will export once the new steady state equilibrium is attained.
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the domestic market and liberalize domestic trade. The sooner a well-developed modern market system
is established, the higher the aggregate productivity would likely be, and the smoother the transition.
5 Conclusion
Firm-level export patterns in China are different from those in developed countries and they may seem
to be at odds with existing literature. Nevertheless, this can be explained by isolating processing trade
from the regular export behavior in the context of heterogeneous firms literature. In particular, we
have incorporated pure exporters into a single sector of Melitz (2003) model to explain how the pattern
of trade in China is determined by the interaction of trade barriers and the large scale of processing
trade. This model captures the existence of pure exporters and their infeiror productivity. It further
explains how trade liberalization affect the aggregate productivity, welfare and export performances of
Chinese firms.
In other words, this paper has described and analyzed a fundamental issue of coexistence, even
within the same industry of exporters, pure exporters and non-exporters. The paper shows how the
presence of processing trade alongside of the domestic trade costs drastically affect how the impact of
trade is distributed across different types of firms. The less efficient firms behave as pure exporters,
the moderate productive firms concentrate on the domestic market while the most efficient ones benefit
from trade in revenues and profits. More importantly, our analysis reveal that increases in a coun-
try’s exposure to trade unequivocally engender welfare gains, however, the domestic market distortion
could impede firms’ performances and hinder the aggregate productivity improvement. Furthermore,
the model highlights that trade-induced reallocation effect of export which may generate aggregate
productivity growth does not work effected in industries where processing trade is pervasive.
The recognition in the nature of firm heterogeneity is important because it will generate new insights
concerning the current trade pattern and growth. Exporting is especially considered as an engine of
growth in China. Processing trade does, indeed, have a significant positive effect on labor employment
and it substantially utilizes our comparative advantage in labor intensive products. However, the
long-run benefits associated with trade still depends on the productivity improvement. It is therefor
imperative to have a model that can look into the costs and benefits of export processing and predict
the impact of trade policies on various types of firms. Consequently, a deeper understanding of the
factors that drive firms’ export success will facilitate the design of policies that promote trade and
ultimately growth in China. Interesting areas for future research include investigating the impact of
trade liberalization on foreign-owned, private firms and state-own enterprises separately and empirically
testing of our model’s theoretical predictions. In addition, further quantitative analysis of the effect of
trade liberalization on wages and welfare in both China and other countries would be interesting.
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A Appendix: Equilibrium Conditions
A.1 Derivation of Average Revenue
Average revenue of a Chinese firm can be determined as follows:
r¯c = p
s
cr
s
c(ϕ˜
s
c) + p
d
c(r
d
c (ϕ˜
d
c) + p
x
c r
x
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c ))
= psc
∫ ϕ∗d
ϕ∗s
rsc(ϕ)g(ϕ)
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
dϕ+ pdc
(∫ ∞
ϕ∗d
rdc (ϕ)g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗d)
dϕ+ pxc
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
rxc (ϕ)g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗x)
dϕ
)
= psc
∫ ϕ∗d
ϕ∗s
σfwc
(
ϕ
ϕ∗s
)σ−1 g(ϕ)
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
dϕ
+ pdc
(∫ ∞
ϕ∗d
σ(f + fd)wc
(
ϕ
ϕ∗d
)σ−1 g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗d)
dϕ+ pxc
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
σfxwc
(
ϕ
ϕ∗x
)σ−1 g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗x)
dϕ
)
= pscσfwc
(
1
ϕ∗s
)σ−1 ∫ ϕ∗d
ϕ∗s
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
dϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ϕ˜sc)
σ−1
+ pdcwcσ
(
(f + fd)
(
1
ϕ∗d
)σ−1 ∫ ∞
ϕ∗d
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗d)
dϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ϕ˜dc )
σ−1
+pxcfx
(
1
ϕ∗x
)σ−1 ∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗x)
dϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ϕ˜xc )
σ−1
)
= pscσfwc
(
ϕ˜sc
ϕ∗s
)σ−1
+ pdcσwc
[
(f + fd)
(
ϕ˜dc
ϕ∗d
)σ−1
+ pxcfx
(
ϕ˜xc
ϕ∗x
)σ−1]
, (A.1)
which depends solely on the productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
x, and parameters. The average revenue
of a foreign firm can be derived as the similar way
r¯f = σ(f + fd)wf
(
ϕ˜df
ϕ∗df
)σ−1
+ pxfσfxwf
(
ϕ˜xf
ϕ∗xf
)σ−1
. (A.2)
A.2 Derivation of Free Entry Conditions
Combining the ZCP1 and FE1, and use the definition of aggregate average productivity from (11)−(13),
we obtain a single equation that determines the productivity cutoff in China
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Similarly, combining the ZCP2 and FE2, and use the definition of aggregate average productivity from
(16)− (17), we obtain a single equation that determines the productivity cutoff in Foreign Country
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B Appendix: Determination of the Equilibrium
B.1 Derivation of Price Indices
Using the equilibrium pricing rules, domestic cutoff productivity in China, foreign exporting produc-
tivity threshold, and the ex post productivity distributions from both countries, we obtain the price
index in China:
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Analogously, using the equilibrium pricing rules, zero profit productivity cutoff in Foreign Country, pure
and regular export productivity cutoff levels of Chinese firms, and the ex post productivity distributions
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from both countries, the price index in Foreign Country is obtained:
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B.2 Trade Balance Trade
Balanced trade condition implies the representative agents in both countries each satisfying their re-
spective budget constraint. It can be explicitly written as:∫
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B.3 Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Cutoff Level
With asymmetric countries, the steady-state industry equilibrium can be referenced by a vector of
variables {ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x, ϕ∗df , ϕ∗xf , Rc, Rf , Pc, Pf}, in terms of which all other endogenous variable can be
written. First, we repeat the free entry conditions
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Proof J(ϕ) is decreasing function on (0,+∞)
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∗
s)
ϕ∗s
)σ−1
=
g(ϕ∗s)
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
[(
ϕ˜sc(ϕ
∗
s)
ϕ∗s
)σ−1
− 1
]
− σ − 1
ϕ∗s
(k(ϕ∗s) + 1)
=
g(ϕ∗s)
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
k(ϕ∗s)−
σ − 1
ϕ∗s
(k(ϕ∗s) + 1)
We have defined J(ϕ∗s) = [G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)]k(ϕ∗s), then its derivative and elasticity is given by:
J ′(ϕ∗s) = −g′(ϕ∗s)k(ϕ∗s) + (G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s))k′(ϕ∗s)
= −g′(ϕ∗s)k(ϕ∗s) + (G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s))
[
g(ϕ∗s)
G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)
k(ϕ∗s)−
σ − 1
ϕ∗s
(k(ϕ∗s) + 1)
]
= − 1
ϕ∗s
(σ − 1)(G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s))(k(ϕ∗s) + 1) < 0. (B.3)
J ′(ϕ∗s)ϕ∗s
J(ϕ∗s)
=
1
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗s(σ − 1)(G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s))(k(ϕ∗s) + 1)
[G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)]k(ϕ∗s)
= −(σ − 1)
(
1 +
1
k(ϕ∗s)
)
< −(σ − 1). (B.4)
For the rest types of firms, we proceed our proof as follows 10: recall that k(ϕ) =
(
ϕ˜(ϕ)
ϕ
)σ−1
− 1
where the aggregate productivities of all other types firms are defined as:
ϕ˜(ϕ)σ−1 =
1
1−G(ϕ)
∫ ∞
ϕ
ξσ−1g(ξ)dξ (B.5)
Differentiating (B.5) with respect to ϕ yields:
∂ϕ˜(ϕ)σ−1
∂ϕ
=
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ) [ϕ˜(ϕ)
σ−1 − ϕσ−1]
Therefore
k′(ϕ) =
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ)
[(
ϕ˜(ϕ)
ϕ
)σ−1
− 1
]
−
(
ϕ˜(ϕ)
ϕ
)σ−1σ − 1
ϕ
=
k(ϕ)g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ) −
(σ − 1)[k(ϕ) + 1]
ϕ
=
k(ϕ)g(ϕ)ϕ− (σ − 1)[k(ϕ) + 1](1−G(ϕ))
(1−G(ϕ))ϕ
We have defined J(ϕ) = [1−G(ϕ)]k(ϕ), then its derivative and elasticity are given by:
J ′(ϕ) = − 1
ϕ
(σ − 1)[k(ϕ) + 1](1−G(ϕ)) < 0, (B.6)
J ′(ϕ)ϕ
J(ϕ)
= −(σ − 1)
(
1 +
1
k(ϕ)
)
< −(σ − 1). (B.7)
10this proof is from Melitz (2003)
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Therefore, we have proved J(ϕ) is non-negative and its elasticity with respect to ϕ is negative
and bounded away from zero, J(ϕ) must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to infinity. Furthermore,
limϕ→0 J(ϕ) =∞ since limϕ→0 k(ϕ) =∞. Thus, J(ϕ) = [1−G(ϕ)]k(ϕ) decreases from infinity to zero
on (0,∞); ∂ϕ∗s∂ϕ∗d ,
∂ϕ∗x
∂ϕ∗d
and
∂ϕ∗xf
∂ϕ∗df
are all positive. Consequently, the left hand side of (21) and (22) must
also monotonically decrease from infinity to zero on (0,∞). The right-hand side of these two equations
are constant. Consequently, (21) identifies a unique cutoff level ϕ∗d in China and (22) determines the
industry productivity cutoff ϕ∗df in Foreign Country. Having determined these two cutoffs, all other
productivity cutoffs ϕ∗s, ϕ∗x and ϕ∗xf follows immediately from the relationship between the productivity
offs from (18)- (20). These unique productivity cutoffs, in turn, determine the average productivity
levels according to formulas (11)− (13). The ex ante successful entry in both countries, domestic and
regular export probabilities are also fixed.
Aggregate revenue is exogenously determined and must equal the labor supply multiply wage,
Ri = wiL in both countries. The price index Pc (23) has two components: the prices of a variety with
weighted average productivity in China and Foreign Country, pdc(ϕ˜
d
c) and p
x
f (ϕ˜
x
f ); the mass of foreign
firms that export to China Mxf = p
x
fMf , and the mass of Chinese regular firms, M
d
c . The prices p
d
c(ϕ˜
d
c)
and pxf (ϕ˜
x
f ) depend solely on weighted average productivities in each market, ϕ˜
d
c and ϕ˜
x
f , which in turn
depend solely by two productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
xf , that were determined in (12) and (17). The
probability of foreign firms export to China, pxf = [1−G(ϕ∗xf )]/[1−G(ϕ∗df )], also follows from the two
productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗df and ϕ
∗
xf . Similarly, the price index Pf (24) in Foreign Country consists of
three terms: the prices of a variety with weighted average productivity from foreign producers pdf (ϕ˜
d
f ),
Chinese pure exporters psc(ϕ˜
s
c) and regular ones p
x
c (ϕ˜
x
c ); the mass of foreign firms Mf , the mass of
Chinese pure exporters M sc and regular exporters M
x
c . The prices p
d
f (ϕ˜
d
f ), p
s
c(ϕ˜
s
c) and p
x
c (ϕ˜
x
c ) are solely
rely on three productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗df , ϕ
∗
s and ϕ
∗
x that were determined above. The probability of being
Chinese pure exporters, psc = [G(ϕ
∗
d)−G(ϕ∗s)]/[1−G(ϕ∗s)], and the probability of regular export from
China to Foreign Country pxc = [1 − G(ϕ∗x)]/[1 − G(ϕ∗d)], also follows from the productivity cutoffs,
ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d and ϕx. Finally, the mass of firms in both regions equals the ratio of aggregate revenue to
average revenue, as shown in (25) and (26). Aggregate revenue was solved above, while average revenue
depends solely on the already-determined productive cutoffs. This completes the characterization of
the equilibrium.
B.4 Welfare
Welfare in Chinese market can also be written as a function of the cutoff productivity of ϕ∗d:
Wc =
wc
Rc
= ρ
( L
σwc(f + fd)
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗d. (B.8)
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Similarly, welfare per worker in Foreign country is determined by the domestic zero cutoff profit con-
dition:
Wf =
wf
Rf
= ρ
( L
σwf (f + fd)
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗df . (B.9)
Since ϕ∗df > ϕ
∗
d, welfare in foreign country must be higher than in China: Wf >Wc.
C Appendix: The Impact of Trade Liberalization
These comparative statics are all derived from the equilibrium condition for the cutoff levels from (21)
and (22); and the implicit definition of ϕ∗x and ϕ∗s as a function of ϕ∗d from (17) and (18) in China; ϕ
∗
xf
as a function of ϕ∗df from (19) in Foreign Country.
C.1 Decrease in Fixed Export Trade Costs
Changes in the cutoff levels:
Differentiating fx with respect to ϕ
∗
x = τϕ
∗
d
(
fx
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields ∂ϕ
∗
x
∂fx
= 1σ−1
ϕ∗x
fx
+ ϕ
∗
x
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
.
Differentiating fx with respect to ϕ
∗
s = τϕ
∗
d
(
f
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields ∂ϕ
∗
s
∂fx
= ϕ
∗
s
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
.
Differentiating fx with respect to ϕ
∗
xf = τϕ
∗
df
(
fx
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields
∂ϕ∗xf
∂fx
= 1σ−1
ϕ∗xf
fx
+
ϕ∗xf
ϕ∗df
∂ϕ∗df
∂fx
.
Differentiating free entry conditions of (21) and (22) in both countries with respect to fx, we obtain
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
∂ϕ∗s
∂fx
+ (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
+ J(ϕ∗x) + fxJ
′(ϕ∗x)
∂ϕ∗x
∂fx
= 0
(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗df )
∂ϕ∗df
∂fx
+ J(ϕ∗xf )fxJ
′(ϕ∗xf )
∂ϕ∗xf
∂fx
= 0
Combing the above conditions yields:
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
=
1−G(ϕ∗x)
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗d
+ (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗d) + fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗d
< 0,
∂ϕ∗df
∂fx
=
1−G(ϕ∗xf )
(f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗df ) + fxJ ′(ϕ
∗
xf )
ϕ∗xf
ϕ∗df
< 0,
since J ′(ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and
∂ϕ∗x
∂fx
= − 1
fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
[
(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
+ fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗x
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
+ J(ϕ∗x)
]
> 0,
∂ϕ∗s
∂fx
=
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂fx
< 0,
∂ϕ∗xf
∂fx
= − 1
fxfJ ′(ϕ∗xf )
[
J(ϕ∗xf ) + (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗df )
∂ϕ∗df
∂fx
]
> 0.
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Welfare : Recall from (B.8) and (B.9) that welfare must therefore rise with the decrease in fx since
all of these changes induce an increase in the domestic cutoff productivity levels ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df .
The decrease in fixed export cost fx induces an increase in the cutoff productivity level of pure
exporters. Recall that rsc(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
s)
σ−1σwcf (∀ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d). rsc(ϕ) therefore decreases with
falling export barriers since this change induces an increase in the cutoff productivity level. Thus
rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ) whenever fx
′ < fx since ϕ∗s
′ > ϕ∗s. In other words, the decline in export market access
costs drives the least efficient pure exporters out of the market, and reduces revenue and profits of all
existing pure exporters.
A decrease in fx induces an increase in the domestic cutoff levels in both countries. Take China
as an example, recall that rdc (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
d
σ−1)σwc(f + fd) ∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d. Thus, rdc
′
(ϕ) < rdc (ϕ), ∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d′
since ϕ∗d
′ > ϕ∗d. All existing domestic producers in the new equilibrium with fx
′ fixed export cost
lose a fraction of revenue from the domestic market. In particular, regular producers in China with
productivity levels between ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
d
′ switch to pursue processing trade, while the foreign firms with
productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗df , ϕ∗df ′) exit.
For firms that already exported (ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x) prior to the change in fx, the direction of change in
combined domestic and export sales rdc (ϕ) + r
x
c (ϕ) = (1 + τ
1−σ)rdc (ϕ) decreases in the same proportion
as its domestic sales when fx decreases since 1 + τ
σ−1 remains constant.
Trade liberalization in fx reduces the regular export cutoffs in both regions, and hence generates
a new category of firms with intermediate productivity levels (ϕ∗x
′ ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗x) that enters the export
market as a consequence of the decrease in fx. The new export sales generate an increase in revenue
for all these firms since rdc (ϕ) < r
c
d(ϕ) + r
x
c (ϕ) = (1 + τ
σ−1)rdc (ϕ).
C.2 Decrease in Variable Trade Costs
Changes in the cutoff levels:
Differentiating τ with respect to ϕ∗x = τϕ∗d
(
fx
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields ∂ϕ
∗
x
∂τ =
ϕ∗x
τ +
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂τ .
Differentiating τ with respect to ϕ∗s = τϕ∗d
(
f
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields ∂ϕ
∗
s
∂τ =
ϕ∗s
τ +
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂τ .
Differentiating τ with respect to ϕ∗xf = τϕ
∗
df
(
fx
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields
∂ϕ∗xf
∂τ =
ϕ∗xf
τ +
ϕ∗xf
ϕ∗df
∂ϕ∗df
∂τ .
Differentiating (21) and (22) in both countries with respect to τ yields:
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
+ (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂τ
+ fxJ
′(ϕ∗x)
∂ϕ∗x
∂τ
= 0
(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗df )
∂ϕ∗df
∂τ
+ fxJ
′(ϕ∗xf )
∂ϕ∗xf
∂τ
= 0
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Combining the above conditions together yields:
∂ϕ∗d
∂τ
= −ϕ
∗
d
τ
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)ϕ∗s + fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)ϕ∗x
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)ϕ∗s + (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗d)ϕ
∗
d + fxJ
′(ϕ∗x)ϕ∗x
< 0, (C.1)
∂ϕ∗df
∂τ
= −ϕ
∗
df
τ
fxJ
′(ϕ∗xf )ϕ
∗
xf
(f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗df )ϕ
∗
df + fxJ
′(ϕ∗xf )ϕ
∗
xf
< 0, (C.2)
since J ′(ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
= − (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
fJ ′(ϕ∗s) + fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗s
∂ϕ∗d
∂τ
> 0,
∂ϕ∗x
∂τ
= − (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗x
+ fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
∂ϕ∗d
∂τ
> 0,
∂ϕ∗xf
∂τ
= −(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗df )
fxJ(ϕ∗xf )
∂ϕ∗df
∂τ
> 0.
Welfare : Recall from (B.8) and (B.9) that welfare must therefore rise with decrease in τ since all
of these changes induce an increase in the cutoff productivity levels ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df .
As stated previously, we have rsc(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
s)
σ−1σwcf (∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d). rsc(ϕ) therefore increases
with decreases in τ since this change induces a decrease in the cutoff productivity of pure exporters
(ϕ∗s ↓). Thus rsc ′(ϕ) > rsc(ϕ) ∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d whenever τ ′ < τ (since ϕ∗s ′ < ϕ∗s).
With respect to Chinese domestic producers, recall that rdc (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
d)
σ−1σwc(f +fd) (∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d).
A decrease in τ induce an increase in the domestic cutoff productivity level (ϕ∗d ↑) and rdc (ϕ) therefore
decreases. Foreign Country also behaves the similar pattern that freer trade improves the industry
productivity threshold and reduces the revenue and profits of all existing domestic firms. However, in
contrast to Foreign Country, a set of Chinese firms with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗d, ϕ∗d′) which would have
otherwise been forced to exit switching to processing trade in face of decreasing τ .
Take China as an example, the direction of the change in combined domestic and export sales of
Chinese regular exporters, rdc (ϕ) + r
x
c (ϕ) = (1 + τ
1−σ)rdc (ϕ) 11, will depend on the direction of the
change in (1 + τ1−σ)/(ϕ∗d)
σ−1. It is now shown that these combined sales increase when τ decreases as
(1 + τ1−σ)/(ϕ∗d)
σ−1 then increases:
−∂ϕ
∗
d
∂τ
τ
ϕ∗d
=
[
1 +
(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)ϕ
∗
d
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)ϕ∗s + fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)ϕ∗x
]−1
=
[
1 + τσ−1
∫∞
ϕ∗d
xσ−1g(x)dx∫ ϕ∗d
ϕ∗s
xσ−1g(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, since ϕ∗d /∈ [ϕ∗s , ϕ∗d)
+
∫∞
ϕ∗x
xσ−1g(x)dx
]−1
11Recall that rxc (ϕ) = τ
1−σrdc (ϕ), ∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d
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=[
1 + τσ−1
∫∞
ϕ∗d
xσ−1g(x)dx∫∞
ϕ∗x
xσ−1g(x)dx
]−1
<
[
1 + τσ−1
]
since
∫∞
ϕ∗d
xσ−1g(x)dx/
∫∞
ϕ∗x
xσ−1g(x)dx > 1 as ϕ∗d < ϕ
∗
x. Hence,
∂
[
1+τ1−σ
(ϕ∗d)σ−1
]
∂τ
=
1 + τ1−σ
(ϕ∗d)σ−1τ
[
(1− σ)τ1−σ
1 + τ1−σ
− (σ − 1)∂ϕ
∗
d
∂τ
τ
ϕ∗d
]
=
1 + τ1−σ
(ϕ∗d)σ−1τ
(σ − 1)
[
− ∂ϕ
∗
d
∂τ
τ
ϕ∗d
−
(
1 + τσ−1
)−1]
< 0.
That is, the combined sales of regular exporters rise when τ decrease.
The profit change of a pure exporter (ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d) that is already in processing trade prior to
falling τ can be written as:
∆pisc(ϕ) = pi
s
c
′(ϕ)− pisc(ϕ)
=
1
σ
[rsc
′(ϕ)− rsc(ϕ)]
= ϕσ−1fwc
[
1
(ϕ∗s ′)σ−1
− 1
(ϕ∗s)σ−1
]
,
the term in the bracket is positive since ϕ∗s
′ < ϕ∗s. The pure exporter that export both before and after
the change in τ enjoy a profit increases.
The drop in τ forces previous less efficient domestic producers with productivity level (ϕ∗d ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d′)
in China pursuing processing trade, the profit change of this type of firms can be written as:
∆pi(ϕ) = pisc(ϕ)− pidc (ϕ)
=
1
σ
[rsc(ϕ)− rdc (ϕ)]− fdwc
= wcϕ
σ−1
( f
ϕ∗sσ−1
− f + fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1
)
−fdwc,
substituting (7) and (8) into the above equation reveals the term in the bracket must be negative. The
switching from regular production mode to processing trade incurs both revenue and profit loss.
As was the case with the decrease in fx, falling variable trade costs τ shift down the export pro-
ductivity level from ϕ∗x to ϕ∗x
′. This generates the entry of new firms into the export market. All the
new regular exporters enjoy a revenue gain, but only a portion of these firms also increase their profits.
Specifically, this profit change is negative for the new exporting firms with the cutoff productivity level
ϕ∗x
′
∆pi(ϕ∗x
′) =
rdc
′
(ϕ∗x
′)
σ
+
rxc (ϕ
∗
x
′)
σ
− (f + fd + fx)wc −
[
rdc (ϕ
∗
x
′)
σ
− (f + fd)wc
]
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=
rdc
′
(ϕ∗x
′)
σ
+
rxc
′(ϕ∗x
′)
σ
− fxwc︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pixc (ϕ
∗
x
′)=0
−r
d
c (ϕ
∗
x
′)
σ
=
1
σ
(rdc
′
(ϕ∗x
′)− rdc (ϕ∗x′)) < 0.
Therefore, the firms with productivity ϕ > ϕ† where ϕ∗x
′ < ϕ† < ϕ∗x increase their profits. Firms with
productivity level ϕ > ϕ∗x that export both before and after the change in τ enjoy a profit increase that
is proportional to their combined revenue increase (their fixed costs do not change) and is increasing
in their productivity ϕ:
∆pi(ϕ) =
1
σ
[r′(ϕ)− r(ϕ)]
= ϕσ−1fwc
[
1 + (τ ′)σ−1
(ϕ∗d
′)σ−1
− 1 + τ
σ−1
(ϕ∗d)σ−1
]
,
where the term in the bracket must be positive.
C.3 Decrease in Domestic Trade Costs
Changes in the cutoff levels:
Differentiating fd with respect to ϕ
∗
x = τϕ
∗
d
(
fx
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields ∂ϕ
∗
x
∂fd
= 11−σ
ϕ∗x
f+fd
+ ϕ
∗
x
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
.
Differentiating fd with respect to ϕ
∗
s = τϕ
∗
d
(
f
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields ∂ϕ
∗
s
∂fd
= 11−σ
ϕ∗s
f+fd
+ ϕ
∗
s
ϕ∗d
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
.
Differentiating fd with respect to ϕ
∗
xf = τϕ
∗
df
(
fx
f+fd
) 1
σ−1
yields
∂ϕ∗xf
∂fd
= 11−σ
ϕ∗xf
f+fd
+
ϕ∗xf
ϕ∗df
∂ϕ∗df
∂fd
.
Differentiating (21) and (22) in both countries with respect to fd and using the above three conditions
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
=
1
σ−1
f
f+fd
J ′(ϕ∗s)ϕ∗s +
1
σ−1
fx
f+fd
J ′(ϕ∗x)ϕ∗x − J(ϕ∗d)
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗d
+ (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗d) + fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗d
> 0, (C.3)
∂ϕ∗df
∂fd
=
1
σ−1
fx
f+fd
J ′(ϕ∗xf )ϕ
∗
xf − J(ϕ∗df )
(f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗df ) + fxJ ′(ϕ
∗
xf )
ϕ∗xf
ϕ∗df
> 0. (C.4)
Since in China J ′(ϕ∗d) < 0 ∀ϕ, and (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
+ J(ϕ∗d) < 0
∂ϕ∗x
∂fd
= −
(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
+ J(ϕ∗d)
fJ ′(ϕ∗s)
ϕ∗s
ϕ∗x
+ fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
< 0,
∂ϕ∗s
∂fd
= −
(f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
+ J(ϕ∗d)
fJ ′(ϕ∗s) + fxJ ′(ϕ∗x)
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗s
< 0.
And in Foreign Country J ′(ϕ∗df ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗df )
∂ϕ∗df
∂fd
+ J(ϕ∗df ) < 0
∂ϕ∗xf
∂fd
= −
J(ϕ∗df ) + (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗df )
∂ϕ∗df
∂fd
fxJ ′(ϕ∗xf )
< 0.
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C.3.1 Welfare
Recall the welfare per worker in China is Wc = wcRc = ρ
(
L
σwc(f+fd)
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗d. The direction of the welfare
change induced by a drop in the domestic trade costs is not immediately obvious as fd enters into the
welfare equation. (Recall that a decrease in fd induces a decline in ϕ
∗
d as
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd
> 0). The direction of
the welfare change therefore depends on the direction of the change in
(ϕ∗d)
σ−1
f+fd
.
Proof that
(ϕ∗d)
σ−1
f+fd
Increases when fd decreases
The differential change in
(ϕ∗d)
σ−1
f+fd
is given by:
∂
(
ϕ∗d
σ−1
f+fd
)
∂fd
=
ϕ∗d
σ−1
(f + fd)2
[
(σ − 1)∂ϕ
∗
d
∂fd
f + fd
ϕ∗d
− 1
]
< 0. (C.5)
Hence, a decrease in fd generates a welfare gain.
Recall that the aggregate revenue of domestic firms is exogenously given by Rc = wcL and Rf =
wfL. Hence, r
s
c(ϕ)/Rf represents a Chinese pure exporter’s market share in Foreign Country. In
addition, we have rsc(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
s)
σ−1σwcf (∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d). rsc(ϕ) therefore decreases with falling
domestic trade barriers fd since this change induces a rise in the cutoff productivity level of pure
exporters (ϕ∗s ↑). Thus rsc ′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ) ∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d whenever fd′ < fd (since ϕ∗s ′ > ϕ∗s).
Falling fd creates the entry of new regular producers in both countries. Take China as an example,
a decline in fd leads to efficient pure exporters switching from processing trade to regular production
and starting to serve the domestic market. For a new domestic firm (ϕ∗d
′ < ϕ ≤ ϕ∗d), the profit change
can be written:
∆pi(ϕ) = pidc (ϕ)− pisc(ϕ)
=
1
σ
[rdc (ϕ)− rsc(ϕ)]− fdwc
= wcϕ
σ−1
(f + fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1 −
f
ϕ∗sσ−1
)
−fdwc, (C.6)
substituting (7) and (8) into the above equation reveals the term in the bracket must be positive.
The profit change ∆pi(ϕ) is thus an increasing function of firm’s productivity ϕ. Therefore, the new
domestic firms increase their revenue and profits. The impact of changing production mode is similar
to Melitz (2003) of moving from autarky to trade.
For Chinese firms (ϕ∗d ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗x) that already in domestic market prior to the change in fd, the
impact of falling fd on the profit is
∆pi(ϕ) = pidc
′
(ϕ)− pidc (ϕ)
=
1
σ
[rdc
′
(ϕ)− rdc (ϕ)]− (f + fd′)wc − (f + fd)wc
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= wcϕ
σ−1
[
f + fd
′
(ϕ∗d
′)σ−1
− f + fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1
]
− (fd′ − fd)wc (C.2)
(C.5) reveals
∂
(
f+fd
ϕ∗
d
σ−1
)
∂fd
> 0. This implies that f+fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1 decreases when fd falling down and hence that
f+fd
′
(ϕ∗d
′)σ−1 <
f+fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1 . This inequality implies that the ∆pi(ϕ) is a decreasing function of ϕ since the bracket
in (C.2) is negative. Therefore, an existing domestic producer experiences both revenue and profits loss
in the new equilibrium.
The change in profits earned by a firm that export in the new equilibrium (ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x′) can be written:
∆pi(ϕ) = (1 + τ1−σ)ϕσ−1wc
[
f + fd
′
(ϕ∗d
′)σ−1
− f + fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1
]
− (fd′ − fd)wc.
The direction of the change in combined domestic and export sales also depends on f+fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1 . It showed
above that these combined profit will decrease when fd decreases.
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